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abstract
The link between economic growth and the size of the public sector has fuelled 
one of the most wide-ranging debates in economic literature and the empirical 
evidence is far from conclusive. With different techniques that encompass both 
country-to-country causality analysis with VAR models and standard and grouped 
panels, we study this relationship for a sample of 25 countries from the 1960s 
to the present. Our contribution is fundamentally methodological, overcoming 
several pitfalls of the previous literature, namely, endogeneity, dynamic effects and 
common patterns. The results do not support the fulfilment of the Wagner’s Law 
and a negative effect of public size on economic growth is highlighted.
Keywords: Economic Growth, Public Sector, VAR Model, Panel Analysis.
resumen
La relación entre tamaño del sector público y crecimiento económico ha 
dado lugar a una ingente literatura, tanto teórica como empírica.  Sin em-
bargo, la evidencia está muy lejos de ser concluyente.  Este trabajo tiene por 
objeto investigar dicha relación para una muestra de 25 países europeos des-
de la década de 1960 hasta la actualidad.  A tal efecto, se aplican diversas 
técnicas que comprenden el análisis de causalidad individual con modelos VAR 
y modelos de datos de panel, tanto tradicionales como de efectos agrupados. 
Nuestra contribución es esencialmente metodológica, puesto que permite su-
perar algunos de los principales escollos de la literatura anterior: la endogenei-
dad, los efectos dinámicos y la omisión de patrones comunes.  Los resultados 
obtenidos no sustentan la ley de Wagner y destacan, para la muestra seleccio-
nada, la existencia de un efecto negativo del tamaño del sector público sobre 
el crecimiento económico.
Palabras clave: Crecimiento económico, sector público, modelos VAR, 
modelos de datos de panel.
JEL classification: C22, C33, H50, 043.
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1. introduction*
The relationship between government size and economic growth has fuelled 
one of the most wide- ranging debates in economic literature. On the one hand, 
the so-called Wagner’s Law establishes that economic growth, and the social 
transformations that come with it, will lead to an increase in governmental activity. 
The complexity of developed societies and the consideration of certain public 
services as high income elasticity goods could explain this positive relationship 
between the GDP per capita and the public expenditure-to-GDP ratio. On the 
other hand, the high level of public spending in European economies and the fall 
in GDP growth rates has opened a debate on the potential negative effects of 
public sector size on economic growth, which are based on two main premises: 
The effects of taxation on the system of incentives and the reduction in efficiency 
caused by rent-seeking activities. However, endogenous growth theories deem 
the public sector-economic growth relationship non-linear (Barro, 1990), depending 
on whether the positive effects of public spending on productivity are greater than 
the taxation distorting effects or not, a question also dependent on the time frame 
and the sample of countries (only developed countries, or else emerging and 
developing countries as well) selected for study. Empirical evidence on the public 
expenditure-economic growth relationship is far from conclusive. With respect 
to Wagner’s Law, econometric studies have only found a positive relationship in 
certain countries and time periods. By contrast, the public sector size-economic 
growth relationship yields a negative sign in most studies. See Bergh and 
Henrekson (2011) for a literature overview. 
Most of the empirical literature dealing with these matters presents methodo-
logical problems related to the adopted specification, the possible existence of 
endogeneity and reverse causality, and the econometric technique chosen (cross-
section, panel data, cointegration...). However, one of the main weaknesses is 
due to the fact that the correlation observed in some studies does not necessarily 
imply the existence of causality in one direction or in the other. This paper aims 
precisely to verify the existence of causality, its direction, and the dynamics of 
the long-term public expenditure-economic growth interaction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the different subsections of 
Section 2 we present the data, describe the methodology and offer a first view 
*María Dolores Gadea acknowledges the financial support from Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y 
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(ERDF, EU) under grants ECO2017-83255-C3-1-P and ECO2017- 83255-C3-3-P (AEI/ERDF, EU).
54 Eduardo Bandrés, María dolorEs GadEa
of the results. In Section 3 go deeper into the analysis and implications of the 
results. Finally, in the section of conclusions we summarize the main contribu-
tions and results of the paper. An Appendix presents extra results.
2. data and methodoloGy
2.1. data
We use a wide sample of European countries from 1960 to the present. It 
is made up of 25 countries including countries of the European Union, in its 
successive phases of enlargement, as well as outside it. We use the real GDP 
growth (GDP ) and the ratio of total public spending over GDP (PS) to represent 
the rhythm of economic growth and the size of the public sector, respectively. 
The source of both variables is the OECD Economic Outlook and, although the 
sample period is 1960-2017, the start date is different for each country1.
Figure 1 displays the evolution of the two variables during the period studied 
for each country. Overall, the public expenditure-to-GDP ratio grows from the 
1960s until the beginning of the 1980s. However, there are great differences 
among countries. In 1981, public spending exceeded 50% of GDP in Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, The Netherlands, and Sweden, and was very close 
to that figure in France and Germany, whereas in Greece, Iceland, Portugal, and 
Spain was less than 40%.
In the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, an average public spending 
rise may be observed, led by Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Finland, and 
Denmark). From then on, there was first a regressive trend, followed by a public 
sector stabilization which came to be disrupted by the advent of the Great 
Recession. The subsequent public spending adjustment and growth recovery 
led to France, Finland, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway being the countries with 
the biggest public sector size in 2017. At the other extreme we find Ireland, 
Switzerland, some Eastern European countries like Latvia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Slovakia and Poland, as well as the United Kingdom and Spain.
As a general rule, four Western European countries show a rising trend, only 
recently stabilized: Finland, France, Greece, and Portugal. By contrast, coun-
tries with high spending levels have stabilized these figures over the past twenty 
years: Austria, Denmark, and Italy. Some show a significant reduction of public 
expenditure relative to GDP in the past twenty years: Belgium, The Nether-
lands, Norway, and Sweden. Even countries with smaller public sectors, like Ger-
1 The countries are the following: Austria (1961, 1960), Belgium (1961, 1964), Czech Republic 
(1994, 1995), Denmark (1964, 1964), Estonia (1996, 1995), Finland (1961, 1960), France (1961, 
1964), Germany (1964, 1964), Greece (1964, 1954), Hungary (1992, 1995), Iceland (1961, 
1964), Ireland (1964, 1964), Italy (1961, 1960), Latvia (1997, 1995), Luxembourg (1961, 1990), 
Netherlands (1961, 1964), Norway (1961, 1964), Poland (1991,  1995), Portugal (1961, 1964), 
Slovak Republic (1992, 1995), Slovenia (1996, 1995), Spain (1961, 1964), Sweden (1961, 1964), 
Switzerland (1965, 1960) and the United Kingdom (1961, 1964). In parenthesis we have displayed 
the starting date for GDP and PS, respectively.
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many and Spain, follow the same path. According to the available information, 
since 1995, Eastern European countries also followed a downward trend in the 
first few years which later stabilized.
Growth rates show a downward trend in most countries if we consider a time 
frame from the 1960s on. This is more markedly so in the cases of France, Por-
tugal, Spain, Greece, and Belgium, but also, more mildly, of Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, The Netherlands, and Norway. Other countries, on the contrary, kept 
their growth rates broadly stable, save for natural oscillations: Germany, Iceland, 
Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Thus, it seems that there is a relationship between the public sector size 
growth from the 1960s and 1970s and the fall in economic growth rates begin-
ning in the mid-seventies and eighties, that is, a few years later, which explains 
the cumulative and long-term effects. Conversely, one may also interpret that 
economic growth gives rise to a bigger size public sector, although the results ap-
pear earlier.
Maps in figures 2 and 3 show the geographical distribution of the average 
GDP growth and the public spending ratio. The color scale reflects the 
different intensity of the two variables and allows us to have a first image of 
their magnitude. Finally, in Figures 4 and 5 we carry out a scatterplot of both 
variables average and a linear regression for the 1964-2017 period, including 
the selected countries from which there are data available (Figure 4), as well 
as for the 1995-2017 period for the full sample of countries (Figure 5), which 
represent the stylized facts about their relationship. A close examination of 
these figures allows us to identify a negative trend between both variables, 
more clearly showing in the full sample of countries examined between 1995 
and 2017. Regressing GDP on PS for the entire period (1964-2017) and only 
Western European countries, the trend coefficient value is -0.06, with a t-ratio of 
-2.6, the proportion thus exceeding the significance threshold. In the enlarged 
sample of countries, now including those from Eastern Europe but only for the 
1995-2017 period, coefficient value is even more negative, -0.12, with a t-ratio 
of -2.0, which is equally significant. Summing up this first aggregate picture, we 
find a negative relationship between both variables.
After this descriptive analysis, in the next section we will carry out a more 
formal econo- metric analysis both from the point of view of individual countries 
and jointly through a panel.
2.2. methodoloGy
Our empirical strategy comprises two stages. Firstly, we apply an individual 
analysis by country using VAR models that provide tools for analyzing causality 
between economic growth and public spending. Secondly, we carry out an 
analysis of panel data both in its standard version and in a more innovative one 
that allows us to group countries according to the intensity of the relationship of 
interest.
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2.2.1. country analysis
A simple way to analyse the dynamic relationship between real GDP growth 
and public spending ratio is the use of a standard VAR(p) model.  Following Sims 
(1980) and Lutkepohl  (2005), among many others, we define this model as 
follows:
                                (1)
where Yt=(GDPt, P St)'
 is a 2x1 vector composed of observations of the 
variables, Ψi (i=1, ..., p) are 2x2 coefficient matrices, µ= (µ1, µ2)'
 is a 2x1 
vector of intercept terms,  εt  =  (ε1t, ε2t)'
 in which εit, (i=1, 2) is an unobserv-
able zero mean white noise vector of dimension T , and p is the parameter that 
determines the VAR dimension, chosen according to the SBIC criterion for each 
country. Denoting the lag operator by L, he model is specified as follows:
                         (2)
For simplicity and to save space, the VAR estimation is not reported and we 
focus the analysis on two tools derived from the VAR specification: causality and 
impulse-response functions. Prior to the estimation of the VAR, we confirmed 
the absence of unitary roots in the variables GDP and P S and, therefore, the 
suitability of considering a stationary VAR2.
The previous framework allows us to test the direction of causality. Follow-
ing Granger (1969), a variable (or group of variables), z1, is found to help predict 
another variable (or group of variables), z2. Then, z1 is said to Granger-cause 
z2. We can test this hypothesis by simply studying whether the Ψ matrices are 
triangular, which is a remarkably visual test for a VAR(1). Additionally, a more 
formal Wald test is computed, where the null hypothesis is that z1 does not 
cause z2. More specifically, z1  does not lead to z2  if E(z2t|z2t−1, z2t−2, ...; z1t−1, 
z1t−2, ...) = E(z2t|z2t−1, z2t−2, ...).
The results of the Granger causality analysis are presented in Table 1 and con-
firm an inconclusive pattern of causality within each country. We find that GDP 
influences P S in the case of Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. In the opposite direction, P S influ-
ences GDP in the case of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, 
Italy, Portugal and Switzerland. Therefore, we find bidirectional causality for 
Finland, France, Iceland, Portugal and Switzerland.
Nevertheless the Granger-causality tests may not tell us the complete story 
about the interactions between the variables in a VAR system. It is of interest 
to know the response of one variable to an impulse in another variable in a 
2 The results of the unit root tests and the details of the estimation of the VAR system equations are 
available on request.
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system that involves a number of further variables. Of course, if there is a reac-
tion of one variable to an impulse in another variable we may say that the latter 
causes the former. For this, we employ impulse-response functions (IRFs), also 
called multiplier analysis, to capture the dynamics of the shocks. To obtain IRFs,
we use a moving average representation of the VAR system, which is defined 
in the following expression:
                                      (3)
or, in matrix notation and in terms of the innovations of the structural model: 
Yt=µ+  
The coefficients of the succession of matrices Φ(s) represent the impact of a 
shock in the structural innovation on the variables of the VAR system over time. 
Results of IRF computations with a horizon of 20 years are displayed in the Ap-
pendix, where confidence intervals at 90% are computed according to Kilian’s 
(1998) bootstrap-after-bootstrap method.
Starting with the response of PS to one impulse of GDP, we conclude that 
they are negative at the beginning of the shock in Greece, Ireland, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Switzerland; after around 
5 years in Germany and during all the horizon in France; and, finally, it is positive 
in some periods in Iceland. On the contrary, if we analyze the responses of GDP 
to one impulse of PS, we find week but significant effects which are positive 
in Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg and Switzerland, and negative in Iceland, 
Portugal and United Kingdom. We also observe a high degree of uncertainty 
when the IRFs are non-zero3.
In addition, we compute cumulative impulse-response functions (CIR), de-
fined as CIR=    (h), which allow us to identify the same effects in the long 
run4. The results in Table 2 show that the effect of real GDP growth on public 
spending ratio is positive for most countries (15 in a sample of 25 countries) but 
not significant. We only find a significant and negative effect in France. In the 
opposite direction, from public spending ratio to real GDP growth, mostly CIRs 
are negative (17 in a sample of 25 countries) but not significant in any case.
Summing up, although we have found evidence of causality in both direc-
tions, it is not possible to identify a clear pattern and, in addition, the effects 
are diluted in the long term. The hypothesis of a common relationship will be 
explored in the following section using panel data techniques both standard and 
grouping patterns of heterogeneity.
3 As is well known, the order of variables is relevant for IRF computation because the Cholesky 
decomposition requires triangulation. To test the robustness of the results, we have redone all 
calculations with the system in the inverse order: Yt = (PSt, GDPt)'
 and have also calculated the 
generalized IRF. The findings are the same, which is not surprising, given the results of casualty.
4 The confidence intervals have been computed with the same bootstrap methodology as for the IRFs. 
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2.2.2. panel analysis
The equation for the standard fixed effects model is:
                                    (4)
where αi, (i = 1.n) is the unknown intercept for each country (n country-
specific intercepts), Yit is the dependent variable, where i= country and t= 
time, Xit represents the vector of independent variables, β is a vector of coef-
ficients and uit are the error terms.
As the results obtained previously with the causality test are not conclusive, 
we estimate two equations that treat the GDP and PS variables as endogenous 
or exogenous, alternatively. We propose 4 variants of panel data models:
1. The first one is static, estimated with fixed effects; in this case the equa-
tions are:
                                  (5a)
                                 (5b)
2. The second is dynamic, estimated with fixed effects
                    (6a)
                  (6b)
3. The third is dynamic, estimated with the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
method
4. The fourth is dynamic and deals with patterns of heterogeneity following 
the proposal of Bonhomme and Manresa (2015)
                  (7a)
                  (7b) 
where g = 1, ..., G is the label of each group and G the total number of clus-
ters of countries.
In the three first cases, we find negative and significant relationships be-
tween GDP and PS in both directions (see Table 3). Considering GDP as the 
endogenous variable, we obtain that the implied cumulative public spending 
effects are -0.22, -0.10 and -0.21, respectively. When we treat PS as the 
endogenous variable, these effects are -0.15, -1.00 and -2.66, respectively. 
59InvestIgatIng Causal RelatIons between PublIC sPendIng and eConomIC gRowth In euRoPe
RevIsta de eConomía mundIal 51, 2019, 51-78
Nevertheless, when we apply the grouped fixed-effect approach, the conclu-
sions change dra- matically. In the first case, when GDP is the endogenous 
variable, the long-run effect of PS is -0.04 and it is only significant at the 10% 
level and, when PS is the endogenous variable, the long-run effect of GDP is 
-1.33 but it is not significant.
Maps in figures 6 and 8 show the estimated classification of countries into 
groups for G = 4 when GDP and PS respectively is the endogenous variable. Fur-
thermore, Figures 7 and 9 show the parameter estimates, αgt , and average vari-
ables by groups over time. When GDP is the endogenous variable, we analyse 
the effect of the size of public sector on real GDP growth, we identify three small 
groups; group 2 is formed by Estonia, Iceland and Latvia; group 3  by Greece, 
Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia; group 4 by Ireland; and a big group, 1, 
that contains the rest of the countries.  While the behaviour of groups 1, and 
3 is very similar,   in group 4, the explosive recovery of economic growth after 
the Great Recession of Ireland is highlighted. Group 2 also shows an intense fall of 
economic growth in 1968 due to the behaviour of GDP in Iceland. Considering PS 
as the endogenous variable, we also find 4 groups; group 1 is formed by Iceland; 
group 2 by Ireland; group 3 by Greece and Slovenia; and group 4 by the rest of 
the countries. In contrast to the stable behaviour of PS in group 4, which is 
characterized by a mild growth path that slows down in the 1980s, the more 
rugged patterns of the rest of the groups stand out.
3. results and discussion
The analysis of dynamic relationships between GDP growth and public spend-
ing based on panel data included in Table 3 reveals that Wagner’s Law does not 
apply to this sample of European countries during the time period observed. 
In fact, economic growth elicits a reduction of the public expenditure-to-GDP 
ratio. Both the fixed-effects static model and the two dynamic models con-
sidered present negative coefficients, which, furthermore, show higher absolute 
val- ues in the dynamic models, a natural finding considering that they incor-
porate the long-term relationship dynamics. Long-term effects observed in the 
grouped fixed-effects model are also negative, though not significantly, and the 
algorithm forms a big homogeneous group and several small groups that behave 
as outliers with respect to the common pattern. These results differ from those 
obtained in other studies confirming the validity of Wagner’s Law. The main dif-
ferences are the time frame observed and the countries chosen for the sample. 
In our case, they are all developed countries with high per capita income levels, 
whereas studies confirming the validity of Wagner's Law include middle and low 
income developing countries in their sample and the time frame stretches fur-
ther back. As a matter of fact, the most recent evidence regarding Wagner’s 
Law yields mixed results (Barrios and Schaechter, 2008). As Arpaia and Turrini 
(2008) point out, the result of their estimates seems to suggest that the Wag-
ner’s Law is a phenomenon that mostly pertains to catching-up countries.
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Focusing on the results obtained by country, the specification of a VAR model 
has enabled us to identify causality and the impulse-response functions. The joint 
long-term effects of economic growth on public expenditure are negative in ten 
countries and positive in fifteen, though only significant in the case of France. 
The results obtained using the VAR model are therefore ambiguous, as is to 
be expected from a sample including countries with relevant economic, social, 
and institutional differences. It is worth noting that, among the fifteen countries 
showing positive effects, as opposed to the results based on panel data, there 
are three Mediterranean and five Eastern European countries, where public 
sector development was slower than in Scandinavian countries and the rest of 
the continent. France exemplifies the case of a country where Wagner’s Law does 
not apply. It is the country with the highest public expenditure-to-GDP ratio 
(56.3% in 2017). The evolution of this variable is one of continuous growth from 
1964 to 1994, followed by a period of spending stability and, later, by a slight 
growth due to the Great Recession (Figure 1). At the same time, its GDP growth 
rate has been decreasing, the natural cyclical phases notwithstanding, from the 
1960s to our days. As can be seen in the Appendix, the public spending ratio 
response to the GDP growth impulse is both negative and significant throughout 
the entire time frame, the cumulative impulse-response function being negative 
as well. Therefore, public sector development in France was apparently unrelated 
to economic growth during the period studied, rather being due to different 
factors, while the economy moved in the opposite direction. On the contrary, 
in a country like Italy, with a public expenditure-to-GDP ratio of 48.8% in 2017, 
the public spending trend was more closely linked to the economic evolution, so 
that PS decreasing at first only to become stable from 1992 on, consistently 
with the decreasing GDP growth rates registered since the 1960s. Both the 
impulse-response function (see Appendix) and the positive coefficient of the 
cumulative function (Table 2) also reflect this circumstance.
As far as public spending effects on economic growth are concerned, evidence 
from the first three estimates based on panel data confirm a negative cumulative 
effect of public expenditure on GDP growth in the countries included in the 
sample during the time frame established. And, to a less significant extent, the 
coefficient is also negative in the grouped fixed-effects model. It may thus be 
concluded that, given the level of development of European countries and the 
values of their PS/GDP ratios, the negative effects of public sector size increase 
on economic growth prevail over the positive ones. This result is consistent 
with most empirical studies, which reveal a negative relationship between 
public sector size and growth rates in OECD and EU countries (see Barrios and 
Schaechter, 2008).
At the country level, the joint long-term effects of public spending on economic 
growth were negative in seventeen countries and positive in only eight. In the 
group where negative effects of the public sector prevail we find some countries 
with a high public expenditure-to-GDP ratio, such as France, Finland, Belgium, 
Sweden, Austria and Italy, as well as others with a smaller public sector, such as 
Spain, the United Kingdom and Ireland.
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Among the countries showing negative effects of the public sector size on 
economic growth, France and Italy again stand out on account of high coefficients 
of their cumulative impulse-response functions. In France, the dynamics of 
increasing public spending are among the most intense of the sample and, at 
the same time, decreasing GDP growth rates are registered. Something similar 
may be said of Italy, which presents decreasing growth rates after having 
increased its public spending, though more moderately. A positive effect of the 
public sector size on GDP growth may be observed, on the other hand, in 
Denmark, whose growth rates remain stable throughout the period studied 
while its public expenditure-to-GDP ratio was 51.9% in 2017. As Fournier and 
Johansson (2016) point out, the effects of public spending on growth do not 
only depend on the amount of the former, but also on the efficiency level of 
the public sector, so a spending increase may yield positive effects on growth 
provided there is an efficient public sector.
In conclusion, empirical results reveal that, in the period between the mid-
1960s and the present day, the public expenditure-economic growth relationship 
in Europe has a sounder basis when this relationship is interpreted in terms of 
the effects of spending on growth. Conversely, for the same period, evidence of 
the effects of growth on public expenditure is ambiguous and contradicts the 
validity of Wagner’s Law. It may therefore be argued that, given the current state 
of the European economy and the level of efficiency in the operation of public 
services, a selective reduction of public spending could increase the economic 
growth rate in most countries included in the sample. Naturally, the impact on 
GDP growth would differ from one country to another, depending on the current 
public spending level and public sector efficiency. Negative coefficients of 
cumulative impulse-response functions are especially high, in absolute values, in 
Spain, Italy, Latvia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, and the United 
Kingdom; thus, arguably, the impact of a public spending reduction would 
imply expansive effects on growth rates in these cases. On the other hand, 
countries like Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, Czech Republic and Poland could 
increase the size of their public sectors without affecting their growth rates. See 
Fournier and Johansson (2016) for a detailed analysis of the public sector size-
efficiency relationship and its effects on potential GDP.
4. concludinG remarks
This paper analyzes the elusive relationship between economic growth and 
the size of the public sector for a sample of 25 European countries, and issue that 
continues to be an ongoing debate in the literature. We apply a wide range of 
econometric tools that encompass both country- individual analysis and panel 
data models, which represents methodological contribution with respect to previ-
ous research.
Regarding the effect of economic growth on public size, we find a negative 
and scarcely significant effect, which contradicts the Wagner’s Law. In the oppo-
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site direction, the evidence is clearer and show a negative effect for most countries, 
which is confirmed in the panel framework. These results should be nuanced by the 
period of study and the degree of development of the countries considered, and 
we recommend a deeper research at microeconomic level. Considering the current 
situation of the European economy and the level of efficiency of the public sec-
tor, a selective reduction of public spending might increase economic growth 
in most countries.
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tables
table 1: causality real Gdp Growth and public spendinG ratio
From GDP to PS From PS to GDP
Country Test Pvalue Test Pvalue
Austria 0.337 0.564 6.094 0.017
Belgium 1.581 0.214 4.653 0.036
Czech Republic 0.575 0.457 0.704 0.412
Denmark 0.207 0.891 2.464 0.075
Estonia 0.319 0.858 0.314 0.862
Finland 3.373 0.042 2.924 0.063
France 7.258 0.010 5.813 0.020
Germany 0.368 0.547 1.320 0.256
Greece 1.412 0.254 1.368 0.265
Hungary 0.559 0.697 1.393 0.305
Iceland 2.485 0.058 2.596 0.050
Ireland 4.898 0.005 1.060 0.376
Italy 2.241 0.117 5.031 0.010
Latvia 5.252 0.018 1.110 0.409
Luxembourg 1.613 0.223 1.443 0.268
Netherlands 0.022 0.884 0.104 0.748
Norway 0.240 0.626 0.032 0.859
Poland 1.455 0.287 2.359 0.124
Portugal 5.861 0.001 3.133 0.024
Slovak Republic 1.811 0.195 0.300 0.745
Slovenia 9.442 0.003 0.404 0.802
Spain 3.014 0.089 0.913 0.344
Sweden 4.588 0.037 0.812 0.372
Switzerland 6.429 0.018 7.141 0.013
United Kingdom 0.415 0.663 1.908 0.160
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table 2: cumulative impulse-response functions of real Gdp Growth and public spendinG ratio 
relationships
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Portugal 1.67 -1.91
(-1.34,4.36) (-5.85,2.52)










United Kingdom 1.57 -1.61
(-2.45,5.38) (-5.49,2.97)
table 3: panel estimation
.../...
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Figure 10: Impulse-response function Austria





































Figure 11: Impulse-response function Belgium







































Figure 12: Impulse-response function Czech Re-
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Figure 13: Impulse-response function Denmark





































Figure 14: Impulse-response function Estonia







































Figure 15: Impulse-response function Finland
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Figure 14: Impulse-response function Estonia







































Figure 15: Impulse-response function Finland
Public Spending and Economic Growth in Europe 24
7 Appendix




































Figure 10: Impulse-response function Austria





































Figure 11: Impulse-response function Belgium







































Figure 12: Impulse-response function Czech Re-
public







































Figure 13: Impulse-response function Denmark





































Figure 14: Impulse-response function Estonia







































Figure 15: Impulse-response function Finland
Public Spending and Economic Growth in Europe 24
7 Appendix
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Figure 15: Impulse-response functi Finland
fiGure 11: impulse-response function belGium
fiGure 12: impulse-response function czech republic fiGure 13: impulse-response function denmark
fiGure 14: impulse-response function estonia fiGure 15: impulse-response function finland
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Figure 16: Impulse-response function France







































Figure 17: Impulse-response function Germany









































Figure 18: Impulse-response function Greece












































Figure 19: Impulse-response function Hungary
































Figure 20: Impulse-response function Iceland








































Figure 21: Impulse-response function Ireland



































Figure 22: Impulse-response function Italy









































Figure 23: Impulse-response function Latvia
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Figure 24: Impulse-response function Luxem-
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Figure 26: Impulse-response function Norway


































Figure 27: Impulse-response function Poland




































Figure 28: Impulse-response function Portugal
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Figure 30: Impulse-response function Slovenia



































Figure 31: Impulse-response function Spain
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